Outlook and appraisal [November 2010] by Ashcroft, Brian
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Ashcroft, Brian (2010) Outlook and appraisal [November 2010]. Fraser of Allander Economic
Commentary, 34 (2). pp. 4-21. ISSN 2046-5378
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
Pages 4-21 
Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
 
The Scottish and UK economies 
strengthened appreciably in their recovery 
from recession in the 2nd quarter of this 
year. Preliminary UK data for the 3rd quarter 
indicates some weakening but at 0.8% over 
the quarter growth exceeded expectations. 
Scottish GDP growth fell again in the first 
quarter, by -0.2%, and with zero growth in 
2009q3 and 0.1% growth in the final quarter 
of 2009, there is a case for arguing that the 
Scottish economy did not emerge from 
recession until the 2010q2, two quarters after 
the UK. The Scottish economy went into 
recession one quarter later than the UK. The 
fall in Scottish GDP during the 'recession' to 
2010q1 was therefore -5.81% compared to a 
fall of -6.32% during the recession in the UK, 
still less severe than the UK. But with growth 
of 1.3% in the 2010q2, compared to 1.2% in 
the UK, the Scottish bounce back was 
considerable. However, there is reason to 
believe that an unsustainable bounce back in 
construction and re-stocking were key 
reasons for the strength of the recovery in 
the second quarter which would tend to fade 
away in later quarters. The 0.8% preliminary 
estimate of UK 3rd quarter growth in part 
appeared to contradict that assumption, but 
construction growth remained strong to the 
incredulity of many associated with the 
industry. We still await further data to 
ascertain the spending composition of the 
3rd quarter UK growth rate and whether 
temporary re-stocking was still a principal 
driver, or whether there had been a pick-up 
in more sustainable export and investment 
growth.  
 
In the absence of 3rd quarter Scottish GDP 
data until publication in late January, we 
must rely on survey evidence. This suggests 
a weakening in the Scottish growth, but 
sectors with a strong export focus such as 
engineering continued to recover, perhaps 
buoyed by a favourable sterling exchange 
rate. Those sectors and companies relying 
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more on domestic demand appeared less 
robust, as household and corporate 
confidence weakened, perhaps in part due to 
the uncertain prospect raised by the 
forthcoming public spending cuts. Business 
confidence and optimism about the future 
remained largely weak. There are concerns 
about bank lending, especially in 
construction, as bank deleveraging raises the 
likely cost and availability of funding loans for 
new investment and for refinancing of 
existing debt. 
 
While GDP in Scotland is now clearly rising 
so too is unemployment! GDP has fallen by 
about the same proportion in Scotland as the 
UK during the recession but Scottish 
unemployment has risen more to a rate 
above the UK. From an analysis of the data 
this puzzle may be 'explained' as follows. 
  
First, a comparable GDP fall, other things 
equal, might have been expected to push up 
the Scottish unemployment rate by more 
than the UK for simple arithmetic reasons 
since the Scottish rate was initially 
appreciably below the UK rate. Secondly, 
unemployment rose more quickly than the 
UK after 2009Q2 because inactivity rose 
more quickly in the UK. Thirdly, there was 
significant measured job loss in Scotland in 
2010Q1. Inactivity rose strongly in Scotland 
dampening the rise in unemployment but 
suggesting that Scottish unemployment may 
continue to rise relative to the UK if some or 
all of the increased numbers of inactive 
workers decide to return to the labour 
market. Finally, there is the possibility that 
measurement error is clouding the outcome. 
If some of the measured surge in Scottish job 
losses actually occurred before 2009Q4 then 
that in itself would account for some of the 
faster rise in unemployment. By 2010q1 the 
contraction in Scottish jobs over the 
recession was, at -4.47%, a lot greater than 
the UK contraction of    -2.54%. Total 
Scottish employment had fallen by -114,000, 
Scottish unemployment had risen by 112,000 
and Scottish and UK inactivity had moved to 
comparable levels. So, maybe there isn't a 
puzzle at all! And while considerable 
personal and family pain lies behind such job 
losses there may be a silver lining for the 
Scottish economy. The greater Scottish job 
loss and comparable GDP change suggests 
a relative rise in Scottish productivity. If so, 
average Scottish competitiveness will have 
risen. 
 
Looking forward, the UK monetary policy 
environment remains supportive with interest 
rates held at 0.5% but with additional 
monetary expansion put on hold at the most 
recent MPC meeting. UK inflation stands at 
3.1%, high by international standards, so the 
MPC must trade off potential inflationary risk 
against the prospect of weakening growth 
and a continuing output gap. 
 
Fiscal policy is markedly contractionary. 
Following the Comprehensive Spending 
Review the expected cut in the Scottish 
government's budget is expected to be 
around 11% by 2014-15. We have re-
estimated the impact of this cut in DEL, 
which in the previous Commentary we took 
to be 14%. Total job losses range from -49, 
000 in the flex-price case to -113,000 in the 
fixed-price case, with GVA falling by just over 
-1% and just under -3.5%. Public sector job 
losses range from just under 60,000 to a little 
under 71,000. Private sector job losses are 
moving towards 43,000 in the fixed price 
case but when wages and prices are flexible 
there is a private sector job gain of 10,500. In 
this latter case, as before, there is a 
'crowding-in' effect on private sector activity 
due to the fall in wages and intermediate 
input prices improving the competitiveness of 
the sector. However, the 'crowding-in' effect 
is relatively weak and certainly insufficient to 
offset the public sector job losses. 
Of course, the Scottish government has 
options which in effect may change the 
measured Scottish structural and behavioural 
relationships that are present in our model. If 
these are exercised in the forthcoming 
Budget, the GVA and job loss could be 
lower. 
 
There is considerable uncertainty whether 
private sector growth will pick up sufficiently 
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to offset the planned contraction in public 
spending.  Such a private sector recovery is 
currently much dependent on the growth of 
exports and investment because household 
spending remains subdued as families deal 
with the aftermath of the financial crisis and 
recession. Companies are becoming cash 
rich as rising profits increase their cash 
holdings. They are therefore in a position to 
begin investing on a much increased scale. 
Companies main concern will be uncertainty 
about demand and export demand in 
particular. They will also be concerned about 
the availability of bank lending to support 
own resources. While there is clear evidence 
of growth in the world economy, the 
weakness of the US economy is a cause for 
concern.  
 
Against this background we are forecasting 
GVA growth of 1% this year, which is greater 
than our June forecast of 0.7%. Household 
spending is recovering but increases only 
marginally this year, then increases slightly in 
2011 and is close to trend in 2012. The rise 
in planned welfare cuts since our last 
forecast will take out nearly £2bn of demand 
from Scottish households by 2014-15. The 
timing is uncertain but we expect it to 
contribute to the weak growth of household 
spending. Export growth picks up this year 
as the growth of world trade recovers. There 
is strong positive growth for Scottish exports 
both to rest of world and rest of UK, with the 
latter weaker due to the fiscal consolidation. 
Private sector investment growth in 2010 is 
revised up from our June forecast and the 
rebound continues into 2011 and 2012 after 
a recession that produced one of the most 
severe contractions in private investment in 
modern times. The fiscal consolidation has 
broadly the same aggregate impact as 
forecast in June. All these reasons taken 
together lead to a forecast of 1.1% GDP 
growth in 2011 and 1.9% in 2012. That is the 
same as the June forecast for 2011 but 
slightly lower for 2012. Our fear is that the 
greater welfare spending cuts may dampen 
growth in 2012 compared to our previous 
forecast. Compared to the UK these 
forecasts suggest that the recovery 
continues to be weaker in Scotland than the 
UK, especially in 2011. 
 
In the labour market, net jobs grow by -0.6% 
in 2010, +1.0% in 2011, and +1.8% in 2012. 
By 2012, total jobs are forecast to be around 
47,000 lower than the last peak in 2008. By 
sector, the burden of jobs losses is borne by 
the service sector in 2010 with net job losses 
of just under 14,000. Construction loses just 
above 900 jobs this year, while jobs are 
gained - just under 2,000 - in production as 
manufacturing especially expands. Positive 
but fairly weak jobs growth occurs in all 
aggregate sectors in 2011 and 2012. We 
predict that unemployment will continue to 
rise into next year peaking at around 286,000 
before falling to just under 262,000 in 2012. 
 
 
 
Recent GDP performance 
The Scottish economy grew by 1.3% during the second 
quarter of this year, according to official data released on 
October 20
th1
. This was slightly faster than the UK growth 
rate of 1.2%. Over the year to 2010 Q2 Scottish GDP in 
constant basic prices fell by 1.7%, while UK GDP fell by 
1.5%. Figure 1 shows the quarterly movements in Scottish 
and UK GDP. 
 
In the first quarter of the year Scottish GDP had fallen again, 
by -0.2%, compared to a rise of 0.2% in the UK. Indeed, 
with 2009 Q4 data now revised down to 0.1% growth from 
0.2% earlier it could be argued that Scotland continued in 
recession until 2010 Q1, thereby coming out of recession in 
the second quarter some 2 quarters after the UK. But the 
new revised Scottish data also reveal that the economy did 
not go into recession until 2008 Q3, one quarter later than 
the UK. 
 
The comparative overall GDP performance of Scotland and 
the UK over the recession and subsequent recovery is given 
in Table 1. 
 
The table reveals that scale of the recession was slightly 
weaker in Scotland at -5.69% compared to a fall of -6.32% 
in the UK. Dating the trough of the recession as occurring in 
2009 Q3 we can see that the recovery of 1.21% of GDP is 
weaker here than in the UK where GDP has grown by 2% 
since the trough of the recession in 2009 Q3. 
 
In the 2nd quarter 2010, the service sector – accounting for 
74% of overall GVA on 2007 weights – grew by 0.3% in 
Scotland but  by almost 0.6% in UK – see Figure 2. 
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP growth, 1998q2 to 2010q2 
 
 
 
 
Over the year to 2010 Q2, GVA in Scottish services fell by -
1.2% compared to a fall of -1% in the UK. The comparative 
overall GVA performance of Scottish and UK services over 
the recession and subsequent recovery is given in Table 2. 
The first point to note from Table 2 is that the recession was 
shallower in services compared to the economy as a whole  
with GVA falling by -4.36%. The recession in Scottish 
services was also shallower than in UK services where GVA 
fell by -4.64%. But the UK service sector, as with the 
economy as a whole, is recovering more quickly growing by 
1.55% since the recession trough compared to growth of 
0.18% in Scottish services.  
 
 
Table 1:  Scottish: and UK GDP: recession and recovery 
 
     Scotland UK 
GDP fall in recession -5.69% -6.32% 
Change from  peak to 2010 Q2 -4.55% -4.45% 
GDP recovery to 2010 Q2 1.21% 2.00% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Scottish and UK Services GVA: recession and recovery 
 
     Scotland UK 
GVA fall in recession -4.36% -4.64% 
Change from  peak to 2010 Q2 -4.18% -3.16% 
GVA recovery to 2010 Q2 0.18% 1.55% 
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Figure 2:  Scottish and UK services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q2 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Scottish and UK financial services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q2 
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Table 3:  Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA: recession and recovery 
 
     Scotland UK 
GVA fall in recession -11.44% -14.58% 
Change from  peak to 2010 Q2 -9.10% -10.91% 
GVA recovery to 2010 Q2 2.64% 4.30% 
 
 
Table 4:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA: recession and recovery 
 
     Scotland UK 
GVA fall in recession -13.64% -14.50% 
Change from  peak to 2010 Q2 -2.56% -5.97% 
GVA recovery to 2010 Q2 12.82% 9.97% 
 
 
 
Within services, the main sectoral drivers of recovery in 
2010 Q2 were retail & wholesale (10% of overall GVA), real 
estate & business services (REBS) (20% of GVA), and other 
services (5% of GVA). Retail and wholesale grew by 1.8%, 
REBS by 1.7%, and other services by 0.4%. GVA did not 
change in public administration, education & health (21% of 
overall GVA), while output fell in hotels & catering (3% of 
GVA), financial services (8% of GVA), and transport & 
communication  (7% of GVA), by -1.0%, -2.1% and -2.4%, 
respectively.  Retail & wholesale exhibited much stronger 
growth than in the UK where the sector grew by only 0.2%. 
Conversely financial services was much weaker in Scotland 
with the UK sector only contracting by -0.3% – see Figure 3. 
 
The manufacturing sector in Scotland - accounting for 13% 
of overall GVA - grew by 2.2% in 2010 Q2 compared to the 
somewhat weaker growth performance of UK manufacturing 
which grew by 1.6% - see Figure 4. Over the year to the 
second quarter manufacturing contracted by -3.5% in 
Scotland and by -3.1% in the UK. 
 
The comparative overall GVA performance of Scottish and 
UK manufacturing over the recession and subsequent 
recovery is given in Table 3. 
 
The recession is shown to have had a much stronger impact 
on Scottish and UK manufacturing than the economy as a 
whole, and its principal component the service sector. 
Scottish manufacturing lost -11.44% of its output during the 
recession while UK manufacturing suffered an even greater 
output loss of -14.58%. But despite a good start, and better 
performance in the most recent quarter, the recovery in 
Scottish manufacturing has been weaker than its UK 
counterpart with growth of 2.64% compared to 4.30% in the 
UK. 
Within manufacturing, the performance of engineering and 
allied industries was encouraging in 2010 Q2. The sector 
overall accounts for under 4% of economy-wide output, with 
electrical engineering, 'electronics', accounting for around 
one half of the sector's output, while mechanical engineering 
and transport equipment account almost equally for the 
remainder. Electronics grew by 6.5% in the quarter 
compared to 3.3% in the UK, while mechanical engineering 
was weaker growing by 0.3% compared to much stronger 
growth of 5.2% in the UK. Transport equipment, on the other 
hand, grew robustly in Scotland, by 10.1%, while its UK 
counterpart contracted by -0.8%. Growth was fairly broadly 
spread within manufacturing, suggesting that the industry 
may finally be reaping the benefits of a lower sterling 
exchange rate. Metals and metal products grew by 3.2% 
(5.1% in UK), textiles, footwear, leather and clothing grew 
by 4.6% (5.4% in UK), chemicals & manmade fibres grew by 
2.6% (-0.9% in UK) and other manufacturing grew by 0.3% 
(1.4% in UK). Only two principal manufacturing sectors 
contracted in the second quarter: refined petroleum and 
nuclear fuel processing cut back by -3%, while food, drink 
and tobacco experienced a small fall of -0.1%. But within the 
latter sector , the drinks sector contracted significantly with 
output falling -3.3% (-1.6% in UK). In the remaining food and 
tobacco sector GVA grew by 3.9% (1.8% in UK). 
 
Finally, the construction sector grew exceptionally strongly 
in both Scotland and the UK. With growth of 10.4% and 
9.5%, respectively, the sector has bounced back 
significantly after recession as Figure 5 indicates. 
 
The comparative overall GVA performance of Scottish and 
UK construction over the recession and subsequent 
recovery is given in Table 4. In construction, the output lost 
during the recession was clearly the greatest of all the 
principal sectors, with GVA falling by -13.64% in Scotland 
and even larger -14.5% in the UK. Moreover, by the end of 
the second quarter GVA was only 2.56% lower than the 
previous peak before the recession in Scotland and 5.97% 
lower in the UK. The sector has therefore experienced a 
classic 'V' shaped recession in both Scotland and the UK,
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Figure 4:  Scottish and UK manufacturing GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Scottish and UK construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2010q2 
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Figure 6: Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2010q2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: ILO unemployment rates, Scotland and the UK 
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with activity apparently picking up more quickly in Scotland. 
The latest preliminary estimate for UK GDP in the third 
quarter suggests the fast pace of improvement in the sector 
in the UK has continued with growth of 4% posted.  It is 
difficult to be certain whether the rapid return to growth in 
construction will be wholly or partially sustained. Anecdotal 
evidence from the industry in Scotland appears sceptical of 
such a rebound. There are several explanations offered for 
the rapid revival: postponed activity due to bad weather in 
the early part of the first quarter; the delayed consequence 
of the fiscal stimulus; the consequence of the 'flurry' of 
construction contracts signed off by the previous UK Labour 
government. None of these explanations is very convincing.  
 
Figure 6 provides data on the recent GVA output 
performance in key Scottish industry sectors before, during 
and after the recession. The data clearly show evidence of 
recovery across several, but not all, sectors. 
 
Third quarter survey evidence 
Scottish GVA statistics for the 3rd quarter 2010 will not be 
available until 20 January 2011. While 3rd quarter GVA 
statistics were made available for the UK 26 October, they 
represent a first release and are usually revised 
considerably. The Scottish data coming later are more 
reliable and less subject to marked revision. In the 
meantime we must rely on survey data to try and gauge the 
performance of the Scottish economy in the 3rd quarter. 
 
A detailed Review of Business Surveys appears later in this 
Commentary. What that review makes clear is that the 
surveys offered a mixed view of the Scottish economy 
during that period. This in part is due to the coverage of the 
surveys varying between different sectors of the economy. 
So, surveys of Scottish engineering and oil and gas are 
fairly bullish both in terms of actual and expected 
performance. Outside the engineering sector there is some 
consensus that growth weakened in the 3rd quarter 
compared to the second quarter - mirroring the UK GVA 
data - but the CBI survey was more upbeat about expected 
activity in the the fourth quarter than the SCBS, which noted 
a fall in confidence, a fading of the signs of recovery 
experienced in the 2nd quarter, and a downward revision of 
future expectations for the fourth quarter and for the year 
ahead. 
 
So, the surveys appear to broadly agree that growth in the 
Scottish economy slowed in the third quarter but sectors 
with a strong export focus such as engineering continued to 
recover, perhaps buoyed by a favourable sterling exchange 
rate. Those sectors and companies relying more on 
domestic demand appear less robust, as household and 
corporate confidence weakened, perhaps in part due to the 
uncertain prospect raised by the forthcoming public 
spending cuts. Business confidence and optimism about the 
future remains largely weak. Finally, sentiment in the 
construction sector appears at odds with buoyancy present 
in the official GVA statistics, with declining confidence and 
concerns about the availability and cost of bank finance. 
 
Recent labour market performance 
The recent performance of the Scottish labour market has 
been a cause for concern. Indeed, this performance has 
posed something of a puzzle because while GDP and 
output change in Scotland over the recession was no worse 
than the UK, the deterioration in the unemployment rate in 
Scotland has been much worse. Furthermore, the Scottish 
unemployment rate went above the UK rate in the second 
quarter of this year. 
 
Figure 7 tracks the quarterly Scottish and UK unemployment 
rates from the beginning of 1993 until the second quarter of 
this year. During this period there was one key stylised fact 
and three distinct phases. The stylised fact is that both the 
Scottish and UK economies enjoyed falling trend 
unemployment until the recent recession. Secondly, Scottish 
unemployment was below UK unemployment until the 3rd 
quarter 1995 - a probable lagging consequence of the fact 
that Scotland did not suffer a recession in 1990-91, whereas 
the UK did. From the 3rd quarter 1995 until the second 
quarter 2006, Scottish unemployment was higher than the 
UK. But after that, from the 3rd quarter 2006 until the 1st 
quarter of this year, Scotland enjoyed a superior 
unemployment performance. This superior unemployment 
performance may have been due to the following reason. 
Scottish GDP growth was a little less than the UK but overall 
the mid 2000's was one of strong growth. This growth may 
have been associated with a lower unemployment rate in 
Scotland because a faster UK growth rate was required to 
keep unemployment stable
2
. 
 
In order to seek to explain the puzzle concerning Scottish 
GDP and unemployment change during the recent 
recession we have begun a small programme of systematic 
research on that relationship. The first fruits of that research 
are presented in Box 1 in the Forecasts of the Scottish 
Economy section of this Commentary. What we are seeking 
to do is examine statistically, the relationship between GDP 
change and unemployment. As output rises, the demand for 
labour will rise and unemployment will fall, assuming other 
things, such as productivity, hours of work, inactivity, remain 
unchanged. This negative relationship between changes in 
GDP and unemployment is known as Okun's Law after the 
US economist Arthur Okun who specified and provided a 
statistical estimate of the relationship for the US. 
 
Estimating this relationship for the UK going back to 1971 
shows that it is not stable. We have less data for Scotland 
and so are able to estimate the relationship only back as far 
as 1995.  What our results show is that the relationship 
holds for Scotland and the UK, with the UK unemployment 
rate slightly more sensitive than the Scottish rate to GDP 
changes. We are also able to calculate from the estimation, 
the rate of growth of GDP consistent with a stable 
unemployment rate. This proves to be 2% per annum for 
both Scotland and the UK - around 0.5% per quarter. But 
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Figure 8: GVA and jobs in recession and recovery: Scotland and UK 
 
 
 
the research of others also reveals that the relationship 
changes over the business cycle, particularly recessions as 
for example hours of work, labour productivity and inactivity 
changes. This proves to be the case in the most recent 
recession where we can identify a significant break in the 
relationship in the last two years - 8 quarters - of the 15 year 
sample. The sensitivity of unemployment rate changes to 
changes in GDP has risen during the recession in both 
Scotland and the UK. Moreover, the sensitivity of the 
Scottish unemployment rate to the change in GVA rose 
above that estimated for the UK. 
 
We now need to explain why and how the sensitivity of the 
Scottish unemployment rate to GDP change has risen. For 
the moment, until more rigorous research is done, we feel 
that some interesting insights can be obtained from casual 
empiricism. 
 
Figure 8 plots GVA and employment in Scotland and the UK 
during the recession and recovery. 
 
The figure clearly shows that the decline in Scottish GVA 
broadly tracked the decline in the UK but was slightly 
shallower. However, if 2010Q1 is taken as the final quarter 
of the Scottish recession given the fall again in GVA in that 
quarter, we can estimate the drop in GVA during the 
recession to be -5.81% in Scotland and -5.83% in the UK. 
One doesn't need to be a statistician to suggest that there is 
no significant difference between the two. But total 
employment performance does differ. A key event is what 
happened between 2009Q4 and 2010Q1. Scotland lost 
more than fifty thousand jobs, while the UK experienced a 
slight fall. Prior to the final quarter of last year, the Scottish 
jobs market had held up remarkably well, with employment 
falling by -2.39% while GVA fell by -5.62%. The job loss was 
less than the UK employment fall of -2.54% with GVA falling 
by -5.83%. But after the significant haemorrhage of Scottish 
jobs over the winter by 2010Q1 employment had fallen by -
4.47% since the peak prior to the start of recession 
compared to -2.83% in the UK. While of little comfort to 
those who lost their jobs, the bigger jobs cutback in 
Scotland implies that productivity may have improved 
relative to the UK, which might help Scotland's recovery. 
 
Figure 9 charts the behaviour of unemployment numbers in 
Scotland and the UK during the recession and recovery 
indexed to 100 for the start of recession. 
 
What the figure reveals is that the rise in unemployment in 
Scotland broadly tracked the UK during the recession until 
2009Q2 when it began to surge upwards while UK 
unemployment numbers largely stabilised. Two questions 
arise from this chart. First, why did unemployment in 
Scotland surge after 2009Q2? Secondly, why was there not 
a further marked upwards surge in 2010Q1? The answer 
lies in what was happening to inactivity. 
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Figure 9:  Unemployment in recession and recovery, Scotland and UK  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Inactivity in recession and recovery: Scotland and UK 
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Table  5:  Composition of the Fiscal tightening in 2014-15 
 
£ billion March 2010 budget June 2010 budget October 2010  
spending review 
Tax 21.5 29.8 29.8 
Spending 50.9 82.8 80.5 
    
Investment spending 17.2 19.3 17 
Current spending 33.7 63.5 63.5 
of which:    
Debt interest 7 10 10 
Benefits -0.3 10.7 17.7 
Public services 27 42.8 35.7 
    
Total tightening 72.4 112.6 110.3 
% Spending 70 74 73 
% Tax 30 26 27 
 
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies 
 
Figure 10 charts the numbers inactive in Scotland and the 
UK during the recession and recovery indexed to 100 for the 
start of recession. This chart shows that inactivity in 
Scotland, while a little more volatile, broadly tracked the UK 
until the first quarter of 2009. But from 2009Q2 inactivity 
rose quickly in the UK but remained broadly stable, rising 
slightly, until 2009Q4. Given output and employment were 
following broadly similar paths in Scotland and UK during 
this sub-period, this suggests that the surge in Scottish 
unemployment relative to the UK after 2009Q1 was due to a 
greater propensity of recently unemployed Scottish workers 
to offer themselves for work than their rest of UK counter 
parts. However, in the winter of 2009-10 the significant loss 
of Scottish jobs appears to have produced a surge in 
inactivity as large numbers dropped out of the jobs market, 
so that high and rising unemployment did not increase much 
more quickly than in the previous 3 quarters. 
 
So, to summarise. The puzzle of Scottish unemployment 
rising more quickly than the UK, and so rising above the UK, 
at a time of comparable GDP change may be 'explained' as 
follows. First, a comparable GDP fall, other things equal, 
might have been expected to push up the Scottish 
unemployment rate by more than the UK for simple 
arithmetic reasons since the Scottish rate was initially 
appreciably below the UK rate. Secondly, unemployment 
rose more quickly than the UK after 2009Q2 because 
inactivity rose more quickly in the UK. Thirdly, there was 
significant measured job loss in Scotland in 2010Q1. 
Inactivity rose strongly in Scotland dampening the rise in 
unemployment but suggesting that Scottish unemployment 
may continue to rise relative to the UK if some or all of the 
increased numbers of inactive workers decide to return to 
the labour market. Finally, there is the possibility that 
measurement error is clouding the outcome. If some of the 
measured surge in Scottish job losses actually occurred 
before 2009Q4 then that in itself would account for  some of 
the faster rise in unemployment. By 2010q1 the contraction 
in Scottish jobs over the recession was, at -4.47%, a lot 
greater than the UK contraction of    -2.54%. Total Scottish 
employment had fallen by -114,000, Scottish unemployment 
had risen by 112,000 and Scottish and UK inactivity had 
moved to comparable levels. So, maybe there isn't a puzzle 
at all! 
 
The CSR and fiscal consolidation 
 
The UK picture  
The UK coalition government is seeking to remove the UK's 
structural budget deficit and stabilise its debt position by the 
end of the present Parliament in 2015. To achieve this, the 
government announced in its June Budget a fiscal tightening 
of £113bn - around 16% of government spending and 75% 
of current borrowing. On October 20th the government 
produced its Comprehensive Spending Review  (CSR) 
outlining £81bn of proposed spending cuts, with the 
remainder to be financed by higher taxes, such as the 
increase in VAT to be introduced next January. UK 
spending departments are to experience an average real cut 
of just over 11% and welfare spending is to fall by £18bn. 
 
Table 5, produced by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) in 
London, outlines the key changes between the CSR, the 
June coalition Budgets, and the March Budget of the 
previous Labour government. 
 
 
Key points to note about the CSR in terms of the potential 
macro and socio economic consequences are as follows. 
First, the fiscal tightening by 2014-15 at £110bn is slightly 
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less than the £113bn of the June Budget, but considerably 
more than the £72bn proposed by the Labour government in 
its March Budget. Secondly, the balance between spending 
cuts and tax rises is similar across all three budgets being 
close to a 70:30 split. Thirdly, the reduction in spending on 
public services and hence the cuts in departmental 
expenditure limits (DEL) is less in the CSR than in the June 
Budget. The average cut in department DEL by 2014-15 is 
just over 11% compared to 14% in the June Budget. 
Fourthly, the relief for spending on public services and 
departmental DEL is made possible by an increase in the 
cut in welfare benefits to nearly £18bn. The June Budget 
contained just under £11bn planned benefit cuts, while the 
March Budget planned to raise benefits slightly. Fifthly, the 
CSR reduced the planned cut in investment from £19.3bn to 
£17bn thus accounting for the slightly reduced fiscal 
tightening between June and the CSR. The cut in 
investment is now the same as in the March Budget but this 
still means that department's capital budgets are still being 
slashed by -29%. Finally, IFS has analysed the distributional 
consequences of the CSR and concludes that by 2014-15 
the tax reforms and welfare benefit cuts are regressive 
within the bottom 90% of the income range with the poorest 
paying a relatively greater share of their income. Added to 
this is the Treasury's own analysis is that the planned cuts it 
department expenditures and hence public services is 
regressive for those expenditures that can be modelled. 
None of this analysis by IFS and Treasury assumes 
behavioural change in response to tax and welfare reforms 
and spending cuts. 
 
Scottish consequences and impact 
Table 6 shows the Treasury view of the real budget (DEL) 
available to the Scottish government following the CSR. The 
real fall in the Scottish DEL of -10.6% is lower than the fall in 
the overall UK DEL because of the differential pattern of 
spending cuts across departments and the workings of the 
Barnett formula. Comparable programmes such as health 
and education have been significantly protected in the UK, 
in real terms,  rising - for the resource element -  by 1.3% in 
the former and falling by -3.4% in the latter. However, the 
cut in the Scottish government's capital budget is at -38% 
greater than the -29% cut in capital budgets in the UK. This 
is again due to the pattern of UK cuts and the operation of 
the Barnett formula. Two Barnett comparable capital 
programmes have been cut significantly in the UK: school 
building, house building, and hospitals, so that by 2014-15 
the capital budgets of: Education is to be cut by -60%, CLG 
Communities is to be cut by 74%, and NHS capital is to be 
cut by 17%. 
 
 
Table 6:  Scotland's DEL - Treasury view 
 
   £bn in real terms   
 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 % change 
Resource DEL Excl 
depreciation 
24.8 24.3 24.1 23.7 23.1 -6.8 
Change  -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5  
Capital DEL 3.4 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.1 -38.4 
Change   -0.9 -0.1 -0.3 0.0   
Total DEL 28.2 26.8 26.5 25.7 25.2 -10.6 
 
 
 
The Scottish government take a slightly different view from the UK Treasury of their budget. This is shown in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 7:  Scotland's DEL - Scottish government view 
 
   £bn in real terms   
 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 % change 
Resource DEL  25.3 24.3 24.1 23.7 23.1 -8.6% 
Change  -1.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5  
Capital DEL 3.3 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.1 -36.5 
Change   -0.8 -0.1 -0.3 0.0   
Resource non-cash DEL 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 16.7 
Total DEL 29.2 27.4 27.2 26.4 25.9 -11.3 
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The difference between the two views largely amounts to 
the Scottish government's inclusion in the 2010-11 baseline 
of Scotland's £387m share of the £6bn emergency cuts 
introduced by the UK coalition government after the 
election, which the UK government agreed could be 
postponed until fiscal year 2011-12. The Treasury has 
removed this sum from the 2010-11 baseline while the 
Scottish government includes it. The Scottish government 
also includes end year flexibility (EYF) monies drawn down 
in its 2010-11 figure, plus depreciation. The result is a slight 
difference in the real cut over the period, -10.6% for the 
Treasury, and -11.3% for the Scottish government. But the 
big problem is the change between this fiscal year and the 
next fiscal year. There is a real cut of £1.8bn according to 
the Scottish government figures and a smaller real cut of 
£1.4bn. In cash terms, the two figures are £1.3bn and 
£0.9bn. While the Treasury's logic for removing the 
postponed cuts from the 2010-11 baseline seems correct 
according to accounting convention, the Scottish 
government is also correct to highlight the fact that spending 
in cash terms will be £1.3bn lower next year. 
 
We have taken the expected real cut in the Scottish DEL to 
be 11% by 2014-15 and undertaken the same analysis 
using our computable general equilibrium model (CGE) that 
was presented in the previous Commentary. In that analysis 
a 14% DEL cut was assumed. 
 
The new job and GDP estimates are provided in Table 8. 
 
Table 8:  Impact on GVA and Jobs of an 11% cut in Scottish DEL 
 
 
Jobs GVA 
 
Fixed price Flex price Fixed price Flex price 
Private services -35,087 6,382 -2.86% 0.36% 
Manufacturing -2,207 3,028 -0.75% 0.72% 
Construction -4,887 533 -3.39% 0.11% 
Other private -449 575 -0.99% 0.86% 
Private total -42,630 10,517 -2.12% 0.48% 
Public -70,853 -59,104 -8.31% -6.72% 
Total -113,483 -48,587 -3.46% -1.07% 
 
 
As before there are two simulations:  a fixed-price analysis, 
where the cut in DEL leads to a straight reduction in the 
demand for goods and services produced in the Scottish 
economy;  and a flex-price analysis, where wages and 
output prices respond to changes in demand and 
substitution is possible.  Total job losses range from - 49, 
000 in the flex-price case to -113,000 in the fixed-price case, 
with GVA falling by just over -1% and just under -3.5%. 
Public sector job losses range from just under 60,000 to little 
under 71,000. Private sector job losses are moving towards 
43,000 in the fixed price case but when wages and prices 
are flexible there is a private sector job gain of 10,500. In 
this latter case, as before, there is a 'crowding-in' effect on 
private sector activity due to the fall in wages and 
intermediate input prices improving the competitiveness of 
the sector. However, the 'crowding-in' effect is relatively 
weak and certainly insufficient to offset the public sector job 
losses. 
 
Of course, the Scottish government has options which in 
effect may change the measured Scottish structural and 
behavioural relationships that are present in our model. If 
these are exercised the GVA and job loss could be lower. 
 
 
 
Scottish government budget options 
The excellent Independent Budget Review (IBR) considers 
cost savings and revenue raising options as a means of 
limiting cuts to front-line services. Some indication is also 
provided by IBR on where spending cuts might be made. 
But it is highly unlikely that the need for spending cuts will 
be removed by the adoption of some of these other options. 
 
What is required is the adoption of a rational process that 
links fiscal consolidation to the objectives 
 of the Scottish government. Economic stabilisation, 
economic growth and social justice would appear to be key. 
And these objectives may be mutually exclusive to some 
degree: a potential trade-off between equity versus 
efficiency and growth. For example, the CBI seems to think 
so and is asking the UK and Scottish governments to 
prioritise spending on supporting growth e.g. infrastructure 
at the expense of welfare payments. But how much one 
should trade-off equity for growth and efficiency is a value 
judgement and hence a political decision. 
 
That said, we would argue that spending cuts should be 
applied according to the rules of a rational choice model. 
Blocks of spending should be defined at least to Level 4, but 
ideally, in certain areas, further below. Cuts should then be 
applied first to those spending areas where the marginal 
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value per pound spent to government – and hence the 
electorate and wider community – is least. This would rule 
out ‘salami slicing’ and suggests that some 
functions/services with low marginal value should be 
removed altogether. 
 
The application of this principle would rule out ring-fencing 
Level 1 spending areas such as the health budget, and 
hopefully, would also rule out ring-fencing of Level 2 and 3 
spending areas. This is because ring fencing implies that 
every activity upon which money is spent in the health 
budget has a higher marginal value per pound spent than 
spending activity under all other budgets - an unlikely 
proposition. However, some health spending will have a 
very high marginal value, perhaps spending on treatment of 
cancer and heart disease. It is rational to protect such 
areas, subject to the scale of the overall reduction in the 
assigned budget. 
 
The government will not want the fiscal adjustment to 
destabilise the economy or damage long-run economic 
growth, which it is seeking to raise. We would offer the 
following guidance to help protect these important 
objectives. 
 
Stabilisation 
The aim should be to minimise the effect of fiscal 
consolidation on demand in the economy, so reducing 
secondary job losses. There is a limited role here for the 
government of a small open economy. But where cuts have 
to be made, or charges and taxes introduced, the changes 
should focus on spending areas with lower employment 
effects and income effects e.g. public administration rather 
than social work activities; on recipients who have lower 
marginal spending propensities from income received e.g. 
the rich as opposed to the poor, and on consumption rather 
than investment expenditures. Cutting public investment can 
contribute to a reduction in aggregate demand in the 
economy as well as affecting growth. High quality academic 
research by Alesina and Perotti in 1996 notes that “ … fiscal 
adjustments relying primarily on tax increases and cuts in 
public investment tend not to last and are contractionary.” 
 
Against this background it is disappointing to note that 
capital spending has been cut disproportionately at the UK 
level as part of the fiscal consolidation. The Scottish 
government's capital budget is being cut by 36% to 38% by 
2014-15, It is essential that the government explores all 
means possible to protect public capital investment, 
including the most effective funding mechanisms. One 
possibility would be for funds to be transferred from the 
resource - or current spending - budget to capital spending, 
which is allowed within the rules. 
 
Economic growth 
The aim here should be to protect the supply potential of the 
Scottish economy and the drivers of growth. Research 
suggests that innovation and R&D are critical to growth with 
investment especially in infrastructure, enterprise, and skills 
also having an important role to play. Therefore the 
government should consider how best to focus and protect 
spending in such areas. 
 
Innovation and R&D: The government should continue to do 
everything it can to help the private sector undertake R&D 
and innovate, include facilitating technology transfer. This 
requires the protection of university research and policies to 
enhance commercialisation.  
 
Infrastructure projects and investment: We noted above the 
importance of investment to stabilisation. It is also important 
to growth. But the issue isn't simply about trying to protect 
public investment. It is important to continue to encourage 
private sector investment and seek to remove any market or 
institutional obstacles that stand in its way. Inward FDI and 
related export promotion must continue to play a crucial role 
in Scottish economic growth allowing us to link into world 
growth hubs. Policy effort in this area should not be 
reduced. 
 
Enterprise: Scottish Enterprise and the enterprise network is 
an easy target for many people. Yet, Scotland has a 
sustained history of a low-business birth-rate  and weak 
business enterprise: viz. low innovation and R&D. There are 
legitimate questions about how the SE and the network 
secures it’s goals but abolishing and returning the function 
to the civil service is not the answer as the Welsh 
experience shows. 
 
Skills: Are important to regional competitiveness, to 
attracting FDI and hence to growth. But they are necessary 
for growth not sufficient. A dynamic economy with high 
productivity firms will attract in skilled workers from other 
regions and nations. All of which begs the question whether 
we need the skills development policy infrastructure that we 
currently have?  
 
So, faced with the biggest fiscal cutback for many a year, 
the Scottish government should be bold and imaginative. 
There are other options to spending cuts but it is unlikely 
that the need for spending cuts can be removed by these 
other options. 
 
Cuts should follow a rational choice rule where activities of 
least marginal value per pound spent are cut first. This 
would rule out ‘salami slicing’ and ring fencing of whole 
budget areas such as health spending. And, in the light of 
the Government’s economic stabilisation and growth 
objectives, efficient policy spending that promotes the 
drivers of growth should be protected.  
 
Will the fiscal consolidation work? 
The UK coalition government is seeking to remove the UK's 
structural budget deficit and stabilise its debt position by the 
end of the present Parliament in 2015. But there are many 
risks and uncertainties to be confronted along the way.  
 
Pages 4-21 
An economy is not like a household where steps taken to 
balance the budget will work providing the household is 
disciplined enough to stick to the plan. At the economy level 
there are significant interdependencies and uncontrollable 
factors that will affect the outcome. 
The key factor is the growth of the economy. If the UK and 
Scottish economies improve their pace of recovery from 
recession so that growth is more than sufficient to offset the 
6% to 7% fall in aggregate demand caused by the fiscal 
consolidation, then a future recession will be avoided. But 
growth will have to be considerably faster if unemployment 
is to stabilise and then fall. Faster growth is also required in 
order to ensure that tax revenues rise, transfer payments fall 
and the government's finances improve as the coalition 
hopes. 
 
There are favourable precedents. In the UK in 1991 at the 
end of that recession public sector employment stood at just 
over 6 million . In the next 4 years 650,000 jobs were lost 
and 850,000 by 1997. The UK managed this adjustment 
with an overall rise in employment as the economy grew by 
3.1% per annum.  
 
On present UK government plans some 490,000 public 
sector jobs are to go. However, the problem is that the 
recent recession was so much more severe than in the early 
1990s. The Office of Budget Responsibility is forecasting 
growth of 2.6% per annum and many private forecasters 
consider that projection to be too optimistic. For example, 
the National Institute for Economic and Social Research 
forecast in late October that the UK economy will be much 
weaker than the OBR predicts. NIESR predicts that a 
recession will avoided but a projected weaker recovery and 
the fiscal brake on growth means that the public finances 
improve much more slowly than the OBR and the UK 
government expects. 
 
With so much spare capacity after the recession, and a 
weaker Scottish recovery there appears little hope that the 
fiscal cutbacks will 'crowd in' much private sector growth 
here in Scotland. Worse, the fiscal cutbacks may damage 
business and consumer confidence so weakening private 
sector growth at a time when the world recovery from 
recession is faltering. Added to this, despite the many bright 
spots in the Scottish economy, Scotland's record of weak 
entrepreneurship, a low business birth rate, inadequate 
research and development and low innovation,  makes one 
cautious that we can secure the growth in investment and 
exports that is required.  
 
Forecasts 
In the Scottish and UK economies the recovery from 
recession strengthened appreciably in the 2nd quarter of 
this year. Recent preliminary UK data for the 3rd quarter 
indicates some weakening but at 0.8% over the quarter 
growth exceeded expectations. Scottish GDP growth fell 
again in the first quarter, by -0.2%, and with zero growth in 
2009q3 and 0.1% growth in the final quarter of 2009, there 
is a case for arguing that the Scottish economy did not 
emerge from recession until the 2010q2, two quarters after 
the UK. The Scottish economy went into recession one 
quarter later than the UK. The fall in Scottish GDP during 
the 'recession' to 2010q1 was therefore -5.81% compared to 
a fall of -5.83% during the recession in the UK, an almost 
identical outcome. But with growth of 1.3% in the 2010q2, 
compared to 1.2% in the UK, the Scottish bounce back was 
considerable. However, there is reason to believe that an 
unsustainable bounce back in construction and re-stocking 
were key reasons for the strength of the recovery in the 
second quarter which would tend to fade away in later 
quarters. The 0.8% preliminary estimate of UK 3rd quarter 
growth in part appeared to contradict that assumption, but 
construction growth remained strong to the incredulity of 
many associated with the industry. We still await further 
data to ascertain the spending composition of the 3rd 
quarter UK growth rate and whether temporary re-stocking 
was still a principal driver, or whether there had been a pick-
up in more sustainable export and investment growth.  
 
In the absence of 3rd quarter Scottish GDP data until 
publication in late January, we must rely on survey 
evidence. This suggests a weakening in Scottish growth, but 
sectors with a strong export focus such as engineering 
continued to recover, perhaps buoyed by a favourable 
sterling exchange rate. Those sectors and companies 
relying more on domestic demand appeared less robust, as 
household and corporate confidence weakened, perhaps in 
part due to the uncertain prospect raised by the forthcoming 
public spending cuts. Business confidence and optimism 
about the future remained largely weak. There are concerns 
about bank lending, especially in construction, as bank 
deleveraging raises the likely cost and availability of funding 
loans for new investment and for refinancing of existing 
debt. 
 
The UK monetary policy environment remains supportive 
with interest rates held at 0.5% but with additional monetary 
expansion - quantitative easing via the Asset Purchase 
Facility - put on hold at the most recent MPC meeting. UK 
inflation stands at 3.1%, high by international standards, so 
the MPC must trade off potential inflationary risk against the 
prospect of weakening growth and a continuing output gap. 
 
Fiscal policy is markedly contractionary, as the discussion 
above on the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) 
notes, and there is considerable uncertainty whether private 
sector growth will pick up sufficiently to offset the planned 
contraction in public spending. A private sector recovery is 
currently much dependent on the growth of exports and 
investment because household spending remains subdued 
as families deal with the aftermath of the financial crisis and 
recession. Companies are becoming cash rich as rising 
profits has increased their cash holdings. They are therefore 
in a position to begin investing on a much increased scale. 
Companies main concern will be uncertainty about demand 
and export demand in particular. While there is clear 
evidence of growth in the world economy, the weakness of 
the US economy is a cause for concern. The latest US jobs 
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figures, indicating 150,000 net new jobs created in October, 
should be acknowledged and welcomed. But employment in 
the US is still 7.5 million below the level before the 
recession and high levels of unemployment would, given 
population growth, continue for many years if future jobs 
growth continued at that rate. The concern about the 
economy is shared by the Fed prompting it to introduce this 
week a new programme of quantitative easing. Opinion is 
divided on the likely efficacy of the initiative in raising US 
growth. But the likely depressing effect on the nominal dollar 
exchange rate while tending to raise global demand, other 
things equal, appears to be worsening the 'currency wars' 
problem with China in particular as it seeks to defend 
against capital inflows, upward pressure on the renminbi 
and loss of international competitiveness. In sum, the risk is 
increasing of protectionist responses that slow the growth of 
world trade and the global recovery even as global demand 
is rising. 
 
It is against this background that we have prepared our 
latest forecasts. The underlying background, assumptions 
and predictions are discussed fully in the Forecasts of the 
Scottish economy section below. We present here only a 
summary of the main results. 
 
GVA Forecasts 
Table 9 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at 
basic prices - for 2010 to 2012. As before we present a 
central forecast, which we hold to be most probable and 
high growth and low growth forecasts which define the 
range of outcomes in which Scottish growth is likely to fall. 
In the subsequent discussion we concentrate mainly on the 
central forecast. 
 
Table 9: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth in three scenarios, 2010-2012  
 
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
High growth 1.3  2.1  2.4  
June forecast  1.4  2.1  2.8 
Central 1.0  1.1  1.9  
June forecast  0.7  1.1  2.1 
Low growth 0.5  0.3  1.0  
June forecast  0.0  0.1  0.7 
 
 
Positive growth is forecast in all years and on all 3 
scenarios. GVA growth at 1% is forecast to be stronger this 
year than in our June forecast of 0.7%. Household spending 
is recovering but increases only marginally this year, then 
increases slightly in 2011 and is close to trend in 2012. The 
rise in planned welfare cuts since our last forecast will take 
out nearly £2bn of demand from Scottish household by 
2014-15. The timing is uncertain but we expect it to 
contribute to the weak growth of household spending. 
Export growth picks up this year as the growth of world 
trade recovers. There is strong positive growth for Scottish 
exports both to rest of world and rest of UK, with the latter 
weaker due to the fiscal consolidation. Investment growth in 
2010 is revised up from our June forecast and the rebound 
continues into 2011 and 2012 after a recession that 
produced one of the most severe contractions in investment 
in modern times. The fiscal consolidation has broadly the 
same aggregate impact as forecast in June with Scotland 
experiencing a major cut in public spending on both 
resource and capital account next year. All these reasons 
taken together lead to a forecast of 1.1% GDP growth in 
2011 and 1.9% in 2012. That is the same as the June 
forecast for 2011 but slightly lower for 2012. Our fear is that 
the greater welfare spending cuts may dampen growth in 
2012 compared tom our previous forecast. 
 
Compared to the UK these forecasts suggest that the 
recovery continues to be weaker in Scotland than the UK, 
especially in 2011. 
 
Employment forecasts 
Table 10 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for 
the 3 years on the 3 scenarios. 
 
Table 10:  Forecast Scottish net jobs growth in three scenarios, 2010-2012 
 
 2010 2011 2012 
High growth -7,000  42,300  50,404  
June forecast  -20,399  35,142  53,059 
Central  -12,794  21,224  39,141  
June forecast   -33,546  14.856  44,612 
Low growth -22,700  4,400  21,100  
June forecast  -48,129  6,036  6,615 
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Table 10 indicates that our jobs forecast for 2010 is 
appreciably different from June on all scenarios. This is in 
part due to changes in the latest official employee jobs data, 
which significantly revises down estimates for employment 
in 2009. Our lower forecast takes account of that. In 
addition, our employment forecasts also reflect stronger 
predicted GDP growth in some scenarios and years after 
allowing for a changing forecast of productivity increases. 
Net jobs grow by -0.6% in 2010, +1.0% in 2011, and +1.8% 
in 2012. By 2012 total jobs are forecast to be around 47,000 
lower than the last peak in 2008. By sector, the burden of 
jobs losses is borne by the service sector in 2010 with net 
job losses of just under 14,000. Construction loses just 
above 900 jobs this year, while jobs are gained - just under 
2,000 - in production as manufacturing especially expands. 
Positive but fairly weak jobs growth occurs in all aggregate 
sectors in 2011 and 2012. 
 
Unemployment forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
10 below. 
 
Table 11:  ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the 
three forecast scenarios 
 
 
 2010 2011 2012 
ILO unemployment rate 
High growth 9.1%  9.6  8.2  
Central 9.3%  10.7  9.7  
Numbers  245,056  286,821  261,730 
Low growth       
Claimant count rate 
High growth 4.8%  5.1  4.3  
Central 5.2%  5.9  5.4  
Numbers  143,214  167,623  152.959 
Low growth 5.9%  7.2%  7.0%  
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The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies those workers who are out of a job and are looking for work, 
whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed who are in receipt of unemployment benefit. We noted in 
the discussion above of labour market performance during the recession that while job change is a key determinant 
of unemployment, it also depends on movements in inactivity i.e. the numbers not looking for work. We noted how 
inactivity rose last year in Scotland. The paradox is that as job prospects pick up inactivity can fall and unemployment 
may rise. We predict that unemployment will continue to rise into next year peaking at around 286,000 before falling 
to just under 262,000 in 2012. 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
5 November 2010 
 
____________________ 
 
Endnotes 
1
 The latest data include the implementation of significant methodological developments and improvements to the data: updated 
weights to 2007; benchmarking to input-output data to 2007; replacement of panel estimation with ratio estimation for production 
industries; and introduction of an improved measure for health service output. 
 
2 In the statistical work on Okun's Law that we discuss below there is a suggestion that the growth required to keep unemployment 
stable in the 2000s was 0.6% per quarter in the UK compared to 0.5% - over a little longer period - in Scotland.
 
 
